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LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN DIVERSITY: THE
EFFECT OF RULE 17(b) ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
I. Introduction
Limited partnerships are organizations classified under the gen-
eral category of unincorporated associations.' Traditionally, citizen-
ship of limited partnerships in diversity cases was determined under
a common law rule developed for the entire class of unincorporated
associations.' That rule deems unincorporated associations to be
citizens of each state where one of its members resides.3 The federal
courts differ upon the continuing validity and application of this
common law rule regarding limited partnerships.4
Courts have distinguished the modern limited partnership from
those partnerships prevailing at the inception of the traditional
rule.5 Unlike most other forms of unincorporated associations, lim-
ited partnerships were altered significantly by the passage of uni-
form laws throughout the United States.' The Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (ULPA) removed the ability of limited partners to
sue or be sued upon partnership rights.7 This limitation is consid-
ered by some federal courts as a reason to alter the method of deter-
1. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 4(b), 26 (1968) [hereinafter
BROMBERG].
2. Great Southern Fire Proof Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Chapman v. Barney, 129
U.S. 677 (1889).
3. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. at 682.
4. 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 17.25 nn.34-46 (rev. ed. 1977). For cases declaring
citizenship of unincorporated associations to be that of each of its members, see Carlsberg
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977) (limited partner-
ship); Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1975) (reciprocal insurance
association); Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir.) (joint stock associa-
tion), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960). Contra, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.) (per Friendly, J.) (citizenship of limited partnership was that of each
general partner), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d
392 (2d Cir. 1964) (joint stock association citizen of the state where formed); Van Sant v.
American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948) (joint stock association citizen of the state
where formed); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(limited partnership possessed the citizenship of its sole general partner).
5. For a strong defense of this view, see Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1262 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hunter, J. dissenting).
6. See BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26.
7. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26 [hereinafter ULPA].
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mining a limited partnership's citizenship for diversity purposes.8
Other courts have remained faithful to the common law rule.9
Disagreement among federal courts over the citizenship of limited
partnerships centers around the interaction of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(b),'" which guides the determination of proper parties
to an action, and the rule of complete diversity," which dictates that
each opposing interest in a diversity action possesses citizenship of
a different state. Two rules have arisen from this interaction. The
first deems diversity primary and applies the common law citizen-
ship rule for unincorporated associations. When followed literally,
this rule makes the limited partnership a citizen of every state in
which any general or limited partner resides." This first rule effec-
tively precludes limited partnerships from maintaining diversity
actions in the federal courts. i3 The number of limited partners is
usually so great that complete diversity is readily destroyed when
identity of citizenship between one limited partner and an opposing
party is found. 4
The alternative method for determining a limited partner's citi-
zenship first utilizes Rule 17(b) which directs the court to state law
in the location of proper parties to the action. 5 Under state law, the
court may find that general partners alone have standing to sue in
8. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F, Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
9. See note 4 supra.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) entitled "Capacity to-Sue or be Sued" states:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to
sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was
organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
of the state in which the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other
unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may
sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a
substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)
that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be
sued in a court of the United States is governed by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 754 and 959(a).
Id. (emphasis added).
11. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
12. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1977); Grynberg v. B.B.L. Assoc., 436 F. Supp. 564 (D. Colo. 1977).
13. Grynberg v. B.B.L. Assoc., 436 F. Supp. at 568.
14. Id.
15. See note 10 supra.
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the name of the limited partnership because limited partners are
generally not proper parties. 6 It is after the determination as to
proper parties that these courts evaluate diversity. 7 The common
law rule is modified by requiring complete diversity among only the
general partners and opposing interests. This second approach per-
mits limited partnerships greater access to the federal courts.
This Comment will describe the changes in the law which gave
rise to the two methods currently used to derive the citizenship of
limited partnerships. The discussion will include the major pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals, emphasizing the effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure on theories of diversity jurisdiction.
II. Modern Limited Partnerships
The modern limited partnership is composed of general partners
and limited partners."8 Responsibilities of the two categories of part-
ner vary greatly. 9 General partners assume the management control
of the organization much like officers of a corporation. General part-
ners, however, are personally liable in suits against the partner-
ship.2" Limited partners are liable only to-the extent of their individ-
ual investment in the partnership.2' Limited partners must exclude
themselves from any exercise of management or control over the
partnership.22 Their failure to remain detached from management
results in personal liability for the debts of the organization and
automatic classification as a general partner.2 3
16. See, e.g., N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney 1976), adopting ULPA § 26.
17. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1260 (3d Cir.
1977).
18. ULPA §§ 1, 9-10.
19. Professor Bromberg describes the limited partnership as follows:
A limited partnership is formed by compliance with statutory requirements. It consists
of (a) general partners, who manage the business and have the same liability as in an
ordinary partnership, and (b) limited partners, who take no part in management, share
profits, and do not share losses beyond their capital contributions to the firm. A limited
partner may forfeit his limited liability by taking part in control of the business. In
most other respects, limited partnerships are like general partnerships.
BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26, at 143.
20. ULPA § 9(1).
21. Id. § 17(1).
22. Id. § 7: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in
additioi to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the
control of the business."
23. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26, at 147-50.
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The ULPA adopted in all fifty states altered the rights of the two
classes of partners to represent the partnership's claims in the
courts." Where the general partner is able to enforce partnership
rights, the ULPA has denied the limited partner capacity to sue or
be sued concerning those rights. Limited partners are thereby as-
sured of a way to lessen the risk of personal liability for the firm's
obligations. 5
III. The Common Law
Where questions of federal jurisdiction arise, lower federal courts
must seek guidance from past decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.2" However, the Supreme Court has never considered
the diversity status of a limited partnership created under the
ULPA. Although there are two major cases27 in which the Court
established a diversity standard for unincorporated associations,
these were decided before the existence of both the uniform laws28
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The Federal Rules direct
the courts to utilize state law when classifying proper parties in
diversity cases.'" Formerly, such determinations were entirely
within the domain of federal common law which declared all mem-
bers of unincorporated associations to have equal status in the fed-
24. See id. at 143-45.
25. ULPA § 26, "Parties to Actions": "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is
not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to
enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership."
Professor Bromberg discusses the varied interpretations of the ULPA which reduce the
degree of reliance reasonably to be placed upon the act's declaration of limited liability.
BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26, at 147-50.
26. See, e.g., Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254,
1257-59 (3d Cir. 1977).
27. Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partnership
association); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (joint stock association).
28. The ULPA was first adopted by individual states in 1917.
29. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became the law of the United States in 1938.
FED. R. CIv. P. 86(a).
30. Prior to 1938, the federal courts were free to interpret both procedural and substantive
questions in diversity cases without regard to state case law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1 (1842). That is one reason why the early decisions such as Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S.
677 (1889), and Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900), rejected
state rules of capacity. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), established state substan-
tive law as controlling in diversity cases where that law would affect the outcome of the
litigation. See generally Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 526-30 (1928).
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eral courts.' However, when the Court re-examines the capacity of
limited partners to bring suit it will find that the ULPA as adopted
by state law has deprived limited partners of their ability to sue. 2
In addition, the Court must resolve the interaction of the rules of
capacity with the common law diversity status of limited partner-
ships as unincorporated associations.
The major Supreme Court precedent involving the citizenship of
unincorporated associations is Chapman v. Barney,3 3 decided in
1889. Plaintiff, a joint stock company, was organized under New
York law which authorized the company to sue as an entity in the
name of its president. 34 The joint stock company alleged New York
citizenship. 5 However, the Court held that only a corporation may
sue as a citizen of the state under which it was organized. 36 All other
business organizations were deemed partnerships. Thus, for diver-
sity purposes, the unincorporated association was deemed a citizen
of each state wherein its members resided.
The Court classified the joint stock company as a "mere partner-
ship." The phrase was meant to encompass all forms of unincor-
porated associations. The term partnership distinguished the joint
stock company, whose members were of equal status and responsi-
bility, from the corporation, whose stockholders were subsumed by
the corporation to form a separate "personality" in the business
community and before the courts.39 The Chapman Court refused to
expand federal jurisdiction to include entity status for business
groups whose members functioned with equal rank and responsibili-
ties within the organization.4"
The second notable decision establishing a standard for diversity
was Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones"' which involved
31. For a detailed treatment of FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) ("Capacity to sue or be sued") and
its effect on diversity cases, see sections IV and V infra.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSmP LAW § 115 (McKinney 1976).
33. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
34. Id. at 679.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 682.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Supreme Court had previously declared the existence of a "conclusive presump-
tion" that stockholders were citizens of the state where their corporation was domiciled.
Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853).
40. 129 U.S. at 682.
41. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
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an issue similar to that found in Chapman.4" The plaintiffs formed
a limited partnership association, Jones & Laughlins, Ltd.,43
wherein the status of each member was limited." The Court inter-
preted the association's enabling statute as authorizing the associa-
tion to sue or be sued as a citizen of Pennsylvania. 5 Again, the Court
opposed treating the partnership association as an entity for juris-
dictional purposes "although such associations may have some of
the characteristics of a corporation."4 Southern Fire held under
Chapman47 that a limited partnership, defined as containing only
limited partners, was a citizen of every state where one of its part-
ners resided.4"
Southern Fire may not be an apt precedent for determining diver-
sity jurisdiction over the modern limited partnership formed under
the ULPA.1 The act eliminated variations among limited partner-
ship organizations." The limited partnership association is an ex-
ample of a limited partnership form reduced to a rarity as a result
of the uniform act's widespread acceptance.'
Limited partnership associations were first given a statutory
framework in Pennsylvania." They served the function of surrogate
corporations.53 This partnership form, typified in Southern Fire,
contained one class of associate.5" No member could be held person-
42. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
43. The limited partnership association was created by Pennsylvania statute, 1874 Pa.
Laws 271 (current version at 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 341-461 (1964)). In 1966, the statute was
repealed in large part and replaced by a provision for professionals not permitted to incorpo-
rate. No. 519, § 50(g), 1965 Pa. Laws 1305, 1405.
44. The limited partnership association is a statutorily formed organization which allows
its members to escape personal liability for firm debts. Limited partnership associations serve
as a substitute for incorporation. However, the association resembles the corporation so
closely that Professor Bromberg suggested its elimination from partnership classification.
BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26A, at 151-53.
45. 177 U.S. at 450, citing 1874 Pa. Laws 271.
46. Id. at 456.
47. Id. at 454.
48. Id. at 456-57.
49. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1258, 1264
(3d Cir. 1977). See also BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26A, at 152 n.74.
50. See generally BROMBERO, supra note 1, § 26.
51. Id., § 26A, at 151-52.
52. Id. at 151.
53. Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to the Corporation
for the Small Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 29 (1965), cited in
BROMBERO, supra note 1, § 26A, at 151 n.65.
54. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26A, at 151.
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ally liable for the debts of the association.55 Liabilities were paid
solely from the fund of subscribed capital."
Though classified as an unincorporated organization, the limited
partnership association, as described in Southern Fire, is extremely
close in form to the corporation.57 The organization may be taxed
and regulated as a corporation.58 In fact, scholars of partnership law
have expressed doubt regarding the non-corporate status of the as-
sociation ."
Examining the entity status of a limited partnership association
in 1900 necessarily entailed a perspective quite different from the
contemporary consideration given the varied classes of partners de-
fined by the ULPA.6 0 The current problem in federal courts involves
choosing the level of partner within a limited partnership whose
domicile should control for diversity purposes. Southern Fire's asso-
ciation, composed of single status membership, presents a rather
weak precedent upon which to rest a citizenship decision for the
modern limited partnership.
The most recent case decided by the Supreme Court under the
Chapman rule is United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc."1 The United
Steelworkers, an unincorporated labor union, claimed citizenship in
Pennsylvania where the union maintained its principal place of
business." The union was authorized to sue as an entity under
Pennsylvania's common name statute. 3 The Court recognized the
increasing similarity between certain forms of associations and cor-
porate organizations;" nonetheless, its decision reaffirmed the
Chapman rule, that for diversity purposes the union was a citizen
of each state where one of its members resided.65
55. 1874 Pa. Laws 271: 'lAin act authorizing the formation of partnership associations
in which the capital subscribed shall alone be responsible for the debts of the associa-
tion. . . ." (current version at 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 341-461 (1964)).
56. Id.
57. See BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26A, at 151.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 152 n.74. See also Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 745 (1977) (distinguishing the tax status of the limited partnership from that of the
corporation).
60. See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
61. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
62. Id. at 146.
63. Id.
64. 382 U.S. at 149-53.
65. Id. at 151.
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The United Steelworkers Court distinguished its holding in
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co." In Russell, the Supreme Court deter-
mined the citizenship of a business organization created under the
laws of Puerto Rico. 7 The status of the so-called sociedad en
comandita, according to the Court, was recognized within Puerto
Rico as an entity similar to the American corporation, 8 although its
organization closely resembled that of a limited partnership. The
Russell decision described the characteristics of the sociedad.65 Al-
though the description of a sociedad met all the basic requirements
of a limited partnership, the Court granted it entity status deeming
it a citizen of Puerto Rico."0
The Court in United Steelworkers recognized a need to explain
the exceptional nature of the Russell holding.7' The decision noted
a tendency among the courts to interpret Russell as the general rule
rather than a rare exception. Mr. Justice Fortas writing for the
majority in United Steelworkers refused to grant entity status to
unincorporated associations because it would present the Court
with unforeseeable complications.7" It was not within the Court's
purview to assume the difficulty of establishing guidelines for deter-
mining citizenship of unincorporated associations or, more nar-
rowly, unincorporated unions.73 United Steelworkers stressed the
common law view of unincorporated associations as a group of indi-
viduals. Any revision of this rule affecting the jurisdiction of federal
courts must emanate from the legislative branch.
66. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
67. Id. at 477.
68. Id. at 482.
69. Id. at 481.
70. Id. at 482.
71. The holding in Russell required clarification because it was construed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1964), to mean that the Supreme Court had declared limited partnerships
to be juridical persons on a par with corporations. The court in Mason examined state statutes
and prevailing attitudes supporting entity status. Id. at 399-403. The Second Circuit ex-
plained that the modern theory of unincorporated associations had departed from the
Chapman view. The organization had developed into a functioning unit separate from its
individual members. Id. at 398. The Mason interpretation was incorrect because the Supreme
Court in Russell was merely applying civil law standards of Puerto Rico to the definition of a
corporation as it existed under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico. 288 U.S. at 481.
72. 382 U.S. at 152.
73. Id. at 152-53.
74. Id. at 153.
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The decision in United Steelworkers reflects the Court's predilec-
tion toward restricting diversity jurisdiction. Since the late 1800's
there has been a desire to minimize the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts .75 This trend among scholars and jurists to limit the
jurisdiction has continued as a result of the heavy case load burden-
ing the federal courts."6 However, many commentators have argued
forcefully to maintain diversity in those cases for which the jurisdic-
tion was created." Premises upon which diversity was established
have been described as:
1. The desire to avoid regional prejudice against commercial litigants,
based in small part on experience and in large part on common-sense antici-
pation.
2. The desire to permit commercial, manufacturing, and speculative inter-
ests to litigate their controversies . . . with other classes, before judges who
would be firmly tied to their own interests.
3. The desire to achieve more efficient administration of justice for the
classes thus benefited."8
Diversity jurisdiction exists as a principal means of access to the
federal courts. The more liberal interpreters of the jurisdiction opine
that diversity should be conferred in every case where interests are
based in different states."
A similar philosophy surrounded the early decision in Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,S0 where the Court created a fictional
presumption that all stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the
state of incorporation. The Court recognized corporations as artifi-
cial persons with identities separate from that of their sharehold-
ers. 1
75. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499 (1928); but cf. Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,
Present and Future, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1964) (defending diversity jurisdiction) [hereinafter
Moore and Weckstein].
76. See address by Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary (Feb.
13, 1977), reprinted in 97 S.Ct. No. 13 (May 1, 1977); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURIs DICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW (1973).
77. See, e.g., the proposals of the AMERIcAN LAW INSTrUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1301(b)(2), 1302(b) (1969) [hereinafter
ALI STUDY]; Moore and Weckstein, supra note 75, at 32-34.
78. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law and Contemp. Prob.
3, 28 (1948) (footnote omitted).
79. See note 77 supra.
80. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
81. Id. at 327.
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Recognition of entity status for unincorporated associations might
not be an unwarranted expansion of diversity jurisdiction. 2
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. stands as a precedent
confirming the Supreme Court's power to grant unincorporated
associations citizenship in the state of their organization and/or
their principal place of business.
Professors Hart and Wechsler in their casebook, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System, query whether the United
Steelworkers Court could have ruled in favor of the labor union.84
Congress did not consider the status of labor unions when adding
citizenship of corporations provisions to the diversity statute85 in
1958 or when reconsidering it in 1964. Neither Congress nor the
Constitution has addressed the issue.8 Therefore, the Court would
be free to re-examine the function of unincorporated associations in
light of modern business practice and locate the true interests in-
volved for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Professors Moore and Weckstein have written: "[I]ndividual
members are only indirectly affected and it is the organization itself,
the aggregate of all the members bound together by their economic
investment that is the true party in interest. Thus, the principal
place of business is an appropriate criterion by which to govern an
incorporated or unincorporated association's access to federal courts
'87 To follow this approach would in effect alter the Court's view
82. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1092 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
83. See text accompanying notes 157.71 infra for a discussion of the possible effects of FED.
R. Civ. P. 82 upon expansion of the fiction of juridical entities.
84. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 82, at 1092.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
86. HART & WECHSLER at 1092 poses some relevant questions regarding the consequences
of a change in the rule of United Steelworkers v. Bouligny:
Did the Court in Bouligny make too much, or too little, of the addition of § 1332(c)
in 1958 or of its amendment in 1964 . . .? The legislative history shows no considera-
tion of the Bouligny problem, or of the rule of Chapman v. Barney, at either time.
Would it "amend diversity jurisdiction" for the Court to overrule its own prior decision
in Chapman? Did the Court exaggerate the difficulties such overruling would bring in
its wake? How would the overruling have affected an unincorporated association organ-
ized under the laws of state A and having its principal place of business in state B? Is
the problem likely to arise? Aside from any practical difficulties, is there a rational
basis for distinguishing between a corporation and a labor union?
Id. supra note 82 at 1092 (citation omitted).
87. Moore and Weckstein, supra note 75, at 34.
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of unincorporated associations under Chapman v. Barney. A result
similar to that in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. would
occur.
The American Law Institute's (ALI) study of federal jurisdiction
also recommends separate citizenship for unincorporated associa-
tions.8 The study favors this adjustment as consonant with the
purposes for creating the jurisdiction: "General diversity jurisdic-
tion should be retained unless it can be asserted with confidence
that the shortcomings of state court justice which originally gave
rise to it no longer exist to any significant degree."89 The Institute
suggests that unincorporated associations and partnerships be
deemed citizens of the state in which they maintain their principal
place of business. In addition they would retain citizenship in any
state where the organization has carried on a local establishment for
a time longer than two years." The approach taken by the ALI study
answers the Court's claim that a new standard for citizenship brings
uncertainty and undue complications to diversity cases. Although
the Court in United Steelworkers viewed the Institute's reasoning
favorably, it directed such changes to Congress for consideration
88. AL STUDY, supra note 77, §§ 1301(b)(2) and 1302(b).
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id., proposed § 1301(b)(2) states:
A partnership or other unincorporated association capable of suing or being sued as
an entity in the State in which an action is brought shall be deemed a citizen of the
State or foreign State where it has its principal place of business, whether such action
is brought by or against such partnership or other unincorporated association or by or
against any person as an agent or representative thereof.
The commentary to proposed § 1301(b)(2) explains:
One practical effect is not to deprive an out-of-state plaintiff suing such an associa-
tion in the state of its principal activity from access to the federal court because a
member of the association is of the same citizenship as the plaintiff. Also, the associa-
tion with its principal place of business in another state suing as a plaintiff will not
be barred from a federal forum simply because one of its members is of the same
citizenship as the defendant.
Id. at 115.
91. Id. § 1302(b) reads:
No corporation incorporated or having its principal place of business in the United
States and no partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship having
its principal place of business in the United States, that has and for a period of more
than two years has maintained a local establishment in a State, can invoke that
jurisdiction either originally or on Temoval in any district in that State in any action
arising out of the activities of that establishment.
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and delineation. 2
It is clear from this survey of Supreme Court decisions that the
Court is unwilling to exercise its power to alter the traditional status
of the unincorporated association from a group of individuals to that
of a business "personality." However, it is yet unclear how the
courts should treat associations, such as limited partnerships, whose
limited members have been denied legal capacity to represent the
interests of the partnership.
IV. Erie and The Federal Rules: The Circuits Diverge
Defining the citizenship of limited partnerships is distinguishable
from resolving diversity issues confronted by the Supreme Court in
Chapman, Southern Fire, and United Steelworkers. The associa-
tions discussed by the Court were composed of members holding
equal status within the organization. State law in those cases did
not deprive associates of the capacity to sue in the interests of their
associations. Therefore, the Court was free to continue the common
law rule setting the associations' citizenship as that of each mem-
ber's domicile. 3
Limited partnerships, on the other hand, must contain two levels
of partner to satisfy statutory requirements. The limited partner
status is deprived of capacity to sue and be sued in the interests of
the partnership under the ULPA as adopted by state law."
A determination of the citizenship of limited partnerships pres-
ents issues of great significance. In diversity cases, the access of all
unincorporated associations to the federal courts would be greatly
affected depending upon the outcome. If the Court concludes that
capacity should always be determined before diversity is examined,
the Chapman rule could fall by the wayside. 5 Even a narrow inter-
pretation of such a holding would exclude limited partners from the
92. 382 U.S. at 153.
93. See text accompanying notes 26-92 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 1-25 supra.
95. BROMERG, supra note 1, § 58, at 337-38. Many states have adopted common-name
statutes, granting unincorporated associations the right to sue and be sued as entities. These
statutes thereby affect the capacity of such unincorporated associations. As will be explained
in the discussion which follows, a judicial determination of capacity under Rule 17(b) prior
to diversity might indicate that the common-name statutes apply. Such unincorporated
associations would attain entity status in the federal courts as "citizens" of the states in
which they were formed. FEw. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
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Court's diversity considerations."
The foundation for this result remains in the Erie doctrine 7 which
requires that state law be followed in diversity cases where federal
law has not spoken. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorpo-
rate the Erie doctrine into Rule 17(b) governing capacity to sue.9
Therefore, state rules which determine capacity to sue and proper
party questions, would also determine which partners' residences
must be examined to fulfill the diversity requirement.9
The Second and Third Circuits have each approached the prob-
lem differently. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit,
found in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.'0" that complete
diversity between the limited partners of Bache & Co. and Colonial
Realty Corp. was not necessary to satisfy the federal diversity re-
quirement.' 0 The decision utilized Rule 17(b) by implication."
Looking to the law of the forum state, Judge Friendly determined
that the ULPA as adopted by New York'03 allowed consideration
96. Limited partners lack capacity to sue upon partnership rights in the forum state.
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966).
97. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) states, in part: "Capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined
by the law of the state in which the district court is held .... "
99. Professor Wright in section 70 of his treatise, FEDERAL COURTs, discusses the relation-
ship of FED. R. Cirv. P. 17(b) to diversity jurisdiction in this way: "Since the rule [FED. R.
Civ. P. 17(b)] does direct attention to the person with the substantive right sought to be
enforced, state law must be looked to in diversity cases to see who this person is, although
the federal rule then governs on the procedural question of joinder." C.WRGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 70, at 331 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter FEDERAL CouRTs].
100. 358 F.2d 178 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
101. Id. at 183.
102. Although Judge Friendly never cited Rule 17(b) in the Colonial Realty decision, it is
logically the only authority for his utilization of New York capacity rules. FED. R. Cv. P.
17(b).
103. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1977) entitled "Parties to Actions"
states: "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings by
or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against
or liability to the partnership, and except in cases provided for in section one hundred
fifteen-a of this article."
New York does allow limited partners capacity to sue upon partnership rights in one
instance. That is, N.Y. PARTNERSHiP LAW § 115-a(McKinney Supp. 1977) allows a limited
partners' derivative action brought in the right of a limited partnership to procure a judgment
in its favor. See, e.g., Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608, 315 N.Y.S. 2d 332 (1970) where the
court found that a representative action based upon section 115-a of the N.Y. PARTNERSHIP
LAW would lie where there was an alleged breach of a general partner's fiduciary duty to the
limited partners and where wrongful conduct was claimed. See also Comment, Standing of
Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1463 (1965).
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only of general partners for diversity purposes, since, under New
York law, general partners alone could sue on behalf of the partner-
ship. 04
The Second Circuit viewed the capacity requirement as primary,
that is, to be evaluated before diversity is determined.0 5 The reason-
ing underlying the decision, though not fully stated, appears to be
that a plaintiff must have the capacity to assert his right under state
law before a federal court can proceed to examine his citizenship for
diversity purposes. Therefore, only proper parties fulfill the diver-
sity requirement. Capacity under Rule 17(b) must be determined by
the law of the forum state. It follows that those who lack capacity
to appear in the state courts are also excluded as parties from fed-
eral suits involving a like interest.
The Third Circuit reached the opposite result in Carlsberg Re-
source Corp. v. Cambria Savings and Loan Association.0 The
plaintiff was the sole general partner of Carlsberg Mobil Home
Properties, Ltd., a limited partnership. However, the Court chose
to include all the limited partners of the plaintiff partnership in its
diversity determination. 7 Some of the plaintiff limited partners
and all of the defendants were Pennsylvania citizens. The court of
appeals on its own motion dismissed the case for lack of diversity
jurisdiction. 08 A restrictive approach to diversity jurisdiction col-
ored the court's analysis of the case law. 10 The court concluded that
104. 358 F. 2d at 183-84. For a comparison of the New York statute with the ULPA § 26,
see note 103 supra.
105. Judge Friendly stressed the importance of first defining the proper parties to the
action after which diversity jurisdiction is examined:
[W]here, as here, there was diversity between the plaintiff and all the general part-
ners of the defendant, identity of citizenship between the plaintiff and a limited part-
ner was not fatal because under the applicable New York statute a limited partner "is
not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object
is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership." N.Y.
Partnership Law § 115. . . . [A] suit brought against a New York partnership must
thus be considered to be against the general partners only and identity of citizenship
between a limited partner and the plaintiff does not destroy diversity.
358 F.2d at 183-84 (citations omitted).
106. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
107. Id. at 1255.
108. Id. at 1255, 1262.
109. Judge Adams, for the Third Circuit, stated the court's philosophy concerning diver-
sity jurisdiction:
In view of the possibly deleterious consequences of a failure to adhere meticulously to
the constitutional and statutory standards governing diversity jurisdiction, access to
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granting jurisdiction where some limited partners were of the same
citizenship as their adversaries would be an unwarranted expansion
of diversity jurisdiction. The implication"' was that the result
reached by the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty "I permitted mini-
mal diversity in violation of the Supreme Court's pronouncement of
complete diversity"2 in Strawbridge v. Curtiss."'
The Third Circuit interpreted Strawbridge as a firm command
from the United States Supreme Court instructing the federal
courts to accept only cases where no opposing parties share like
citizenship."' However, the wording of the decision leaves a choice
of proper parties to be examined when determining whether diver-
sity is complete. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in
Strawbridge, stated "that where the interest is joint each of the
persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or
liable to be sued, in those [federal] courts.""' 5 The Third Circuit",
the federal courts, on the ground of the diverse citizenship of the parties, should be
granted only where clearly appropriate and only to the extent, if at all, that is justified.
Id. at 1257. For a more liberal approach to diversity jurisdiction, see Moore and Weckstein,
supra note 75.
110. During its discussion of the Colonial Realty decision, the Carlsberg court explained
its disagreement with Judge Friendly's approach to the problem:
Specifically, to ignore an identity of citizenship between limited partners and litigants
with opposing interests, because of reliance on state statutes concerning the capacity
to sue, does operate to liberalize access to the federal courts under diversity jurisdic-
tion. It would seem to follow that Rule 82 bars the utilization of Rule 17 in this context.
554 F.2d at 1261. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 forbids the federal rules of civil procedure from being
invoked to broaden or limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. For a more detailed discussion
of FED. R. Civ. P. 82 and its effect on FED. R. Civ. P. 17, see the text accompanying notes
157-78 infra.
111. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
817 (1966).
112. Minimal diversity occurs when any two opposing interests hold citizenship of differ-
ent states. Congress has granted federal courts jurisdiction over certain interpleader actions
meeting the requirements of minimal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
113. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Strawbridge described the rule of complete diversity
in this way:
The words of the act of congress are, "where an alien is a party; or the suit is between
a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state."
The court understands these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest should
be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in federal
courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that
interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts.
Id.
114. Id. at 267.
115. Id.
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read Chief Justice Marshall's words "competent to sue, or liable to
be sued" to mean that mere citizenship of some state would grant
the initial capacity to determine complete diversity."7 However, the
phrase has been interpreted to require that each party being exam-
ined for diversity purposes must first have the capacity to sue or be
sued concerning the subject matter of the litigation."8 Judge
Friendly had given Strawbridge the latter interpretation in Colonial
Realty. 119
Judge Adams, for the Carlsberg majority, presented three argu-
ments in defense of the court's conclusion. First, any expansion of
diversity jurisdiction would be detrimental to the federal system of
justice and federalism itself.'10 That is, time and funds spent on an
increased caseload would ultimately delay the justice system for all
federal litigants."' Furthermore, broadening diversity jurisdiction
would undermine federalism by permitting an unconstitutional en-
croachment on the rights of state courts to adjudicate their laws.
Second, Judge Adams was troubled by the possibility that diver-
sity jurisdiction could be altered indirectly through state legisla-
tures' amending their capacity laws.122"He found that the holdings
of Chapman, Southern Fire and United Steelworkers' reaffirmed
the standard of complete diversity in that all members of unincor-
porated associations must be counted for diversity purposes regar-
dess of state .law. 24 However, he also noted that "[I]n so stating,
we recognize that the three leading Supreme Court cases in this
area,. . . do not squarely address the exact question posed here-in
effect, whether partners of divergent status may be treated differ-
ently for purposes of an evaluation regarding diversity of citizen-
ship." 2 5
116. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1977).
117. The Carlsberg court noted that "[while the [Strawbridge] Court refers to 'entitle-
ment' to sue, as we read the opinion, it appears to be speaking only to 'entitlement' based
upon the requisite citizenship mandated by the diversity statute." Id. at 1258 n.14.
118. See FEDERL COURTS, supra note 99, § 70.
119. 358 F. 2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1966).
120. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d
Cir. 1977).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1261.
123. See text accompanying notes 33-92 supra.
124. 554 F.2d at 1258-59.
125. Id. at 1259.
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Third, the court explained that capacity and diversity are distin-
guishable.' Diversity is the more fundamental concept in the fed-
eral courts and must be determined before competence to sue is
established.'27 The majority illustrated the separation of capacity
and diversity with two Third Circuit decisions, McSparran v.
Weist 2s and Underwood v. Maloney.'
In McSparran, the court refused tc count the citizenship of a
guardian for diversity purposes."' The court determined that the
guardian was a "straw party" in "a naked arrangement for the
selection of an out-of-state guardian in order to prosecute a diversity
suit."'' The guardian was, therefore, collusively joined in violation
of federal law.' For diversity purposes the citizenship of the minor,
the real party in interest, should have been counted. 3
As pointed out by Judge Hunter's dissent in Carlsberg, the
McSparran holding is an exception to the rule that "capacity to
sue-as dictated by state law-generally selects the proper parties,
for diversity purposes."' 34 McSparran turned upon an interpretation
of a federal statute, 5 to which Rule 17(b) is subject in cases of
parties collusively joined to obtain federal jurisdiction. In Carls-
berg, the federal statuie did not apply to alter the traditional
selection of the proper parties through the use of the law of the
forum state under Rule 17(b).
Underwood v. Maloney3 ' involved a class action by members of
126. The court stated: "[Clonsiderations of varying membership status should not bear
on the fundamental inquiry whether diversity exists." Id. at 1259.
127. Id. at 1260. However, the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court had never
addressed the problem directly. Judge Adams then postulated: "It may be for this reason that
the Supreme Court has, in the leading cases concerning partnerships and other non-
incorporated associations, declined to review problems involving diversity jurisdiction
through the perspective of capacity to sue." Id. See the text accompanying notes 113-18 supra
for a discussion of Strawbridge v. Curtiss.
128. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Fritzinger v. Weist, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
129. 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
130. 402 F.2d at 875.
131. Id.
132. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1359 "[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." Id. (1970).
133. 402 F.2d at 876.
134. 554 F.2d at 1263 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
135. See note 132 supra. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970).
136. 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
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a union. The Third Circuit determined the capacity of the class
using Rule 17(b) and the law of the forum state. The court found
that the Pennsylvania rule requiring unions to litigate as entities
deprived members of capacity to sue or be sued in class actions.'37
On rehearing, the court looked at the class representatives as indi-
viduals and members of the union. However, the Pennsylvania rule
requiring the union to litigate as an entity disqualified union mem-
bers from representing their fellow members in a class action.3" This
reasoning then permitted the Third Circuit to invoke the Chapman
rule:'39 where a state has endowed an unincorporated association
with the capacity to sue or be sued as an entity, "for jurisdictional
purposes the citizenship of an unincorporated association is deter-
mined by the citizenship of its members.' ' 40
The Underwood decision does not entirely support the majority's
point in Carlsberg that capacity is a totally separate issue from
diversity jurisdiction. 4' The Third Circuit did in fact attempt to use
state law in Underwood to determine capacity before it approached
the issue of diversity jurisdiction. 42 Commentators questioned the
result reached in Underwood as a misinterpretation of Rule 17(b)."I
The validity of the Underwood decision was cast further into
doubt by the passage of Rule 23.2144 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides class standing for unincorporated associa-
tions. Therefore, it no longer seems necessary to refer to state law
under Rule 17(b) in a case such as Underwood. Rule 23.2 controls.4 5
Judge Hunter, dissenting strongly from the Carlsberg majority,
found that diversity had been satisfied. 46 His dissent took note of
the changed form of the limited partnership under the ULPA, 4 7 in
137. 256 F.2d at 337-38.
138. Id. at 342.
139. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
140. 256 F.2d at 338.
141. 554 F.2d at 1260. See text accompanying notes 126-133 supra.
142. 256 F.2d at 337-38.
143. See HART & WECHSLEa, supra note 82, at 1093. For a fully developed criticism of
Underwood based on Rule 17(b) in conjunction with the Erie doctrine, see Note, The Problem
of Capacity in Union Suits: A Potpourri of Erie, Diversity and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 68 Yale L.J. 1182 (1959).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2 is entitled, "Actions Relating to Unincorporated Associations."
145. See 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.25, at 17-262 n.32. (rev. ed. 1977).
146. 554 F.2d. at 1266.
147. Id. The Pennsylvania statute governing the capacity of limited and general partners
is based upon the uniform act, ULPA § 26. 59 PA. CONS. STAT. § 545 (1964) states, in part:
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particular the section dealing with the capacity to sue. "' Judge
Hunter questioned the majority's logic in not using the act as
adopted by all the states to determine those properly before the
court:"9 "I fail to see, though, how a court knows whose citizenship
to count without first determining who the parties are. By 'parties'
I mean real parties, those who have the capacity to bring suit, and
in some cases where the categories diverge, those who are the real
parties in interest. No one can examine citizenship in vacuo. "10
Unlike the majority, Judge Hunter was not disturbed by state
legislatures' control over capacity rules and the possible effect on
diversity requirements. 5' He likened the situation to that of out-of-
state executors who are governed by state laws. 2
The dissent found it improbable that legislatures would alter
partnership law with the goal of expanding or contracting diversity
jurisdiction."3 The legislators passed the ULPA in order to reflect
the goals of the limited partnership form." 4 Thus, it would be im-
practical for a state legislature to amend its law for so singular a
purpose as affecting diversity jurisdiction and ignore the value of
the uniform act. Judge Hunter concluded that the customary treat-
ment of limited partnerships in diversity cases is inappropriate for
those partnerships created under the ULPA. 155 Their organization
has altered radically. Therefore, the change requires a new evalua-
tion of the diversity rules by the federal courts. 58
Following the Carlsberg decision a Colorado district court in
Grynberg v. B.B.L. Associates'57 confronted a related problem. The
"A contributor, unless he is [a] general partner, is not a proper party to [a] proceeding by
or against a partnership. For a comparison with the uniform act, see note 25 supra,
citing ULPA § 26 in full.
148. 554 F.2d at 1265 (dissenting opinion).
149. Id. at 1264.
150. Id. at 1263.
151. Id. at 1265 (dissenting opinion).
152. Id. (dissenting opinion). The federal courts are protected against "straw parties" by
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) eliminating federal jurisdiction over actions in which a party is
involved in a case solely for the purpose of gaining federal jurisdiction for the case. See the
text accompanying notes 130-35 supra for a discussion of the McSparran case presenting the
problem more fully.
153. 554 F.2d at 1265 (dissenting opinion).
154. Id. at 1264-65 (dissenting opinion).
155. Id. at 1266 (dissenting opinion).
156. Id. (dissenting opinion).
157. 436 F. Supp. 564 (D. Colo. 1977).
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plaintiff was the sole general partner of Jack Grynberg Associates,
a limited partnership formed in Colorado.'58 He sued B.B.L. Asso-
ciates, one of the limited partners, to recover the value of a quarter
interest in the firm. 5 ' B.B.L. Associates was a general partnership
composed of three Illinois citizens. 160 The defendant argued that the
identity of citizenship among the defendants and one limited part-
ner, not a party to the action, prevented the federal court from
maintaining jurisdiction over the action.'
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held
that the citizenship of limited partnerships in diversity cases is that
of each member, including the limited partners.' Therefore, diver-
sity was destroyed.6 3 The decision further explained the point, men-
tioned briefly by the majority in Carlsberg, 6' that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are self-limiting. Under Rule 82, "[these rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."'6
The court explained that the Colonial Realty decision was an
improper use of Rule 17(b) to expand diversity jurisdiction' in
contravention of the established common law rule.6 7 The vagaries
of state law, the court continued, should never work to alter federal
jurisdiction: "[wiere the 'citizenship' of individuals in an associa-
tion to depend on characteristics, such as capacity to sue, derived
only from the existence of a state law, federal courts in some states
would have jurisdiction over cases which other federal courts could
not hear."'68
The opinion conceded that the ULPA was uniform in all the
states;' however, to permit the ULPA to expand jurisdiction would




162. Id. at 568.
163. Id.
164. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1260-61 (3d
Cir. 1977).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
166. 436 F. Supp. at 568.
167. For a discussion of the common law rule, see the text accompanying notes 26-92
supra.
168. 436 F. Supp. at 568.
169. Id. at 568 n.4.
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create a dangerous precedent for courts interpreting laws which
have not gained nationwide acceptance. 10 Finally, noting an ine-
quitable result in the denial of access to federal courts, Grynberg
called upon Congress to redefine the citizenship of limited partner-
ships. Rule 82 withheld this power from the courts.'
V. Conclusion
An issue of major significance will confront the Supreme Court
when it chooses to resolve the disparity in the Carlsberg and
Colonial Realty cases. Its discussion must clarify the relationship
between capacity to sue through Rule 17(b) and the determination
of diversity jurisdiction. That is, whether Chapman v. Barney, de-
cided under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, should take precedence over
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which refer the federal courts
to state capacity rules. The Chapman rule which bears no relation-
ship to state law, was promulgated under the now defunct federal
common law of capacity. As noted in section IV,7 2 the Chapman
decision and those that followed are distinguishable from recent
cases involving limited partnerships governed by the ULPA.
The mandate of Rule 82 prohibiting the use of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to vary federal jurisdiction may affect the out-
come in the same manner as the Chapman rule. It could be argued
that Rule 82 prevents federal courts from creating a new "person-
ality" fiction for all unincorporated associations as the Supreme
Court did for corporations in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co. 1
73
As for the effect of Rule 17(b) on diversity jurisdiction, it would
seem that diversity is dependent upon the prior determination of
capacity. Since the proper parties before the court vary with each
case, those counted for diversity purposes should reflect the true
interests of the parties. A rule such as Colonial Realty may be
viewed not as an expansion of jurisdiction but as a correct determi-
nation of diversity among proper parties.
In the same vein, the Carlsberg approach does not seem to be a
balanced one. Carlsberg holds that the citizenship of the limited
170. Id. at 568.
171. Id.
172. See text accompanying notes 93-171 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 75-85 supra.
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partners shall be counted where the partnership sues through one
of its general partners. The court in effect grants those limited part-
ners "capacity" to appear before the federal courts.
However, the limited partner would lack competence to sue in
federal court under Rule 17(b) because state law denies the limited
partner capacity to participate in proceedings by or against the
partnershipY 4
The discussion of the McSparran7 1 case indicates that there is
only one proper departure from the usual result that parties who
have the capacity to sue under state law are the identical parties
counted for diversity purposes. A different party would be counted
for diversity jurisdiction where federal statute would supercede
state law. In the McSparran case a guardian, though having the
capacity to sue, was collusively joined to gain diversity. The Third
Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1359 disregarded the citizenship of the
guardian in favor of the minor, who was the real party in interest.
The court was thereby deprived of jurisdiction since diversity was
destroyed. Allowance of suit by an "interested" guardian was not
considered to be an unwarranted expansion of jurisdiction in viola-
tion of Rule 82.111
Under the ULPA no limited partner may involve himself in the
litigation of the rights of the partnership.'77 The federal standing of
limited partnerships should parallel the capacity rules set out by the
ULPA as adopted by the states. The existence of limited partners
should not involve the courts unless the limited partner's rights or
liabilities against the partnership are at stake.7 8
Establishing the citizenship of limited partnerships as that of the
general partners alone is consistent with the goals of diversity juris-
diction. Since the general partners are the sole management arms
of the organization it would be rare if not impossible to find a lim-
ited partnership whose center of activities would be located in a
state other than that of at least one of its general partners. It seems
incongruous to allow the citizenship of a limited partner to destroy
diversity where his only function in the firm is to contribute funds.
174. See ULPA § 26.
175. See text accompanying notes 130-35 supra.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
177. ULPA § 26.
178. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHip LAW § 115-a (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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Limited partnerships are among those business organizations for
which the jurisdiction was created as a protection. These organiza-
tions are not inferior to corporations or partnerships; therefore, their
access to the federal courts should be based upon similar standards.
Marian C. Burnbaum

